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ABSTRACT
The increase in business competition resulting from the
globalization of commercial activity and increasingly rapid
advances in computer-based technologies has changed how
corporate real estate professionals manage their
responsibilities. Because they are responsible for a
significant portion of the company's assets, the decisions
corporate real estate managers make can greatly influence the
value of the firm.
As corporate leaders review their overall operations to
find ways to maintain a competitive advantage, more and more
they are directing their business unit managers to focus
attention and resources on core competencies. Meanwhile, they
are seeking strategic alliances for required services that are
not core competencies with expert outside suppliers. Value is
created through this combination of strengths. The phenomenon
of collaboration is being observed across a wide range of
business activities.
This thesis will examine the theories associated with
strategic analysis and will review specific cases of how and
why corporate real estate managers are using strategic
alliances to add value and increase the competitive advantage
of their companies.
Thesis Supervisor: Sandra Lambert
Title: Lecturer,
Department of Urban Studies and Planning
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
FORCES OF CHANGE
The business environment is becoming more and more
competitive. By many accounts, two basic forces are changing
the way business is being conducted; the globalization of
markets and the rapid rise in the application of technology
(Bremner, 86-94; Crouse, 4-8; Nourse, 18-21; Stevens, 50-51;
"The Global Firm: RIP", 69). These forces are pervasive. The
forces of change are affecting all firms regardless of where
they are located, the products or services they make or sell,
or what markets they compete in (Lewis, 15).
DILEMMA
One of the most common reactions to this increased
competition has been for firms to re-focus their attention on
their central business strengths. This response has become
known as "getting-back-to-basics" or "sticking-to-the-
knitting." However, while engaged in the process of re-
focusing on its basic business strengths, an interesting
dilemma has been constructed for many corporations. As global
competition has raised the standards for quality, performance,
differentiation, and price competitiveness - the range of core
activities the firm performs alone has been narrowed.
This dilemma has created an environment ripe for the
application of strategic alliances. To meet the demands of
the market-place, corporations are finding it necessary to
join forces with other organizations who are dedicated to and
capable of delivering high quality services at competitive
prices (Bleeke and Ernst, 17). The record contains many
examples where corporations are recognizing and embracing
strategic alliances for enhancing their competitive position
regarding the products and services they make available to the
market-place (Stevens, 50; Sabath, 10-14). However, it is
important to note that many alliances do not achieve success.
Bleeke and Ernst studied 49 strategic alliances. They
discovered that while 51% of the alliances were successful for
both partners, a remarkable 33% resulted in failure for both
partners. In their opinion, the most important criterion for
success was the ability of the alliance to evolve beyond
initial expectations and objectives.
IMPLICATION FOR CORPORATE REAL ESTATE
Just as these competitive issues are being addressed by
executives at the corporate level, they are similarly being
confronted by the corporate real estate managers responsible
for delivering real estate services to the corporations'
business units. Many real estate industry experts believe the
global economic pressures forcing corporations to concentrate
on their core business efforts and the speed at which data and
information are processed represent a structural, not
transitory, change in the way work will be accomplished in the
future (Walton, 29). It is likely managers of corporate real
estate units will more carefully examine their business
operations; seeking improvements for increasing their
competitiveness.
These circumstances are being seen as a widening
window of opportunity for real estate service providers to
offer their expertise to the corporate real estate units.
Expert service providers who can demonstrate they are capable
of adding value to the business relationship will be welcomed
as strategic partners.
IMPORTANCE OF CORPORATE REAL ESTATE
Keeping in mind the effects of globalization and the
increasing importance of information technology, this research
will examine how corporate real estate units are using
strategic alliances as they strive to meet the needs of the
corporations' business units. It will investigate why
strategic alliances have been formed and how have they
performed. This is an interesting and important topic for
three main reasons.
First, the conduct of business, whether the scale of the
operation is large or small, is inherently integrated with
real estate issues. Businesses occupy real estate (Nourse,
1). Strategic decisions on the management and operation of a
firm's real estate assets will have a direct affect on the
other aspects of its business. Notwithstanding the current
real estate depression, the level of inflation over the past
20 years has brought about large differences between book
values and market values of real estate assets held by
corporations. Real estate experts have demonstrated how the
value of these assets can be captured by the corporations
through a variety of techniques including sale-leasebacks,
tax-deferred exchanges and redevelopment.
Second, real estate - the offices, factories, warehouses,
stores and land - typically accounts for 25% - 35% of a
corporation's assets (Walton, 26-29; Radding, 56-73). Because
of this significant percentage, it is important to the
economic performance of the corporation to have effective
management of its real estate assets aimed at maximizing
shareholders value. Effective management of such a
significant asset base requires integrating the corporate real
estate strategy with the overall business strategy (Lyne,
998).
Third, occupancy costs are the second largest expense at
many companies, following labor costs. By extension, the
argument is that since labor costs are certainly strategic
then so must be occupancy costs (Parker, 22). Few expense
categories offer as good an opportunity for improving
corporate performance as do occupancy costs. For example,
Shearson Lehman Brothers recently made a thorough analysis of
its branch offices and headquarters office space and found it
could save $20 million annually from its occupancy costs
(Apgar, 124). To help understand the scale of this
opportunity, consider that the ratio of occupancy costs to
revenue for 1989 ranged from 0.3% - 7.9% with an average of
4.3%. Today, most corporate real estate units do not act as
profit centers. The recently published report, "Strategic
Management of the Fifth Resource: Corporate Real Estate"
(Joroff, 26), noted the results of a 1990 study which
concluded 80% of the corporate real estate units surveyed
operated as cost centers while less than 10% operated as
profit centers. Whether structured as a profit center or cost
center, all corporate real estate units can make important
contributions to the corporate bottom line, net operating
income, by their ability to influence operating expenses.
As corporate real estate units managers align their
operations to a more strategic posture for maximizing value,
three conditions will help integrate real estate activities
with overall corporate goals (Valencia, 67-72). First, there
must be a close alliance between the real estate function and
the senior management of the corporation including the Board
of Directors. Second, the real estate function has to
actively participate in the strategic planning efforts of the
company. Third, the real estate department must adopt the
philosophy of organizing its efforts to the goal of real
estate profit maximization.
STRATEGY
DEFINING TERMS
Because words have different meanings for individual
readers, it is useful for clarity to define terms. James
Brian Quinn uses the following definition for strategy.
"Strategy is a pattern of plan that integrates an
organization's major goals, policies, and action
sequences into a cohesive whole. A well-formulated
strategy helps to marshal and allocate an
organization's resources into a unique and viable
posture based on its relative internal competencies
and shortcomings, anticipated changes in the
environment, and contingent moves by intelligent
opponents" (Quinn, 1980).
Quinn distinguishes between tactics and strategy in the
following way. Tactics are short-duration, adaptive, moves
and counter-moves used by competitors to accomplish limited
goals. Strategy defines a continuing basis for the use of
tactics to achieve more broadly defined purposes. Quinn
qualifies the need for using strategy. In his view the
requirement to use strategy depends on the ability of
competitors to intelligently affect one's success in achieving
goals. Absent that ability by the competition, coordinated
planning will suffice (Quinn, 1988, 3).
10
An interesting perspective on strategy formulation has
been identified by Henry Mintzberg (66-75). Mintzberg
observes that strategies need not be deliberate; they can also
emerge. His concept of emerging strategy involves the
simultaneous processing of some seemingly contradictory
notions.
"Therefore, to manage strategy is to craft thought
and action, control and learning, stability and
change."
Mintzberg notes that strategy is usually associated with
future activities, but its links to the past are important.
To further illustrate this point he uses the analogy that just
as life is lived forward but understood backward, managers
should plan strategies for the future by understanding the
past.
STRATEGY AND CORPORATE REAL ESTATE
There is a growing awareness that corporations need to
apply more skillful management to its real estate portfolio in
order to realize the greatest benefits (Nourse, 1991, 18-21).
Minimizing operating costs and maximizing the return on real
estate assets requires selecting real estate strategies that
complement the main corporate strategies.
Nourse has identified how real estate ownership for the
corporate account can be considered a form of backward
vertical integration - the well know strategy for controlling
supply (Nourse, 1990, 67). The strategic benefits of vertical
integration include the ability to control the real estate
resource and the possibility of earning an above average
return on the investment. For example, Nourse cites the
Disney Company's decision to locate its Florida vacation
resort, Disneyworld, in the middle of several thousand acres
of undeveloped land. This allowed Disney to maximize its
capture of the real estate value created by its attraction.
In contrast, Disneyland in California had earlier been
developed on a much smaller parcel and other surrounding land
owners capitalized on the value created by the success of
Disneyland.
Another perspective on the role of corporate real estate
relative to corporate strategy is focused when consideration
is given to mergers, acquisitions and leveraged buyouts
(Joseph, 16). Firms must develop and execute a corporate real
estate investment strategy that is responsive to operating and
financial strategies in order to maximize the real estate
function's contribution to shareholder value. Companies
should continually assess the market value of their properties
and evaluate their relevance to the firm's overall strategy.
CONCEPT OF STRATEGIC ALLIANCE
The primary concept of a strategic alliance is where two
parties agree to cooperate out of mutual need while jointly
sharing risks to achieve a common objective (Lewis, 1). The
motivation that drives the formation of a strategic alliance
is the belief by each party that through joining forces and
working together the two partners will be able to accomplish
goals neither is capable of doing alone.
Business is conducted along a continuum of working
relationships.
"Purely transactional relationships exist where the
customer and supplier focus upon the timely
exchange of basic products for highly competitive
prices anchor one end. Purely collaborative
relationships, or partnerships, anchor the other
end. In the context of the service industry,
partnering is defined as the process where a
customer firm and a supplier firm form strong and
extensive social, economic, service and technical
ties over time, with the intent of lowering costs
and/or increasing value, thereby achieving mutual
benefit" (Anderson and Narus, 95-113).
William T. Agnello of the of the real estate brokerage
firm CBC/Madison Advisory Group, recently described the
"RELATIONSHIP CONTINUUM" model which is used at CBC/Madison to
define the concept of a real estate strategic alliance
(Agnello). According to this model, a successful strategic
alliance requires a relationship of trust between the customer
and the service provider. According to Agnello, the element
of trust allows the relationship to develop on many dimensions
with the objective being to increase the mutual gains of the
two parties. The following three paragraphs further describe
the model.
A Vendor relationship is that which had been least
developed. It is a purchasing transaction where the emphasis
is on meeting the project specifications at the lowest cost
with no opportunity for additional cost improvement. The
trust between the parties is unidentified and there is limited
communications. Performance measurements are rarely defined.
Next on the relationship continuum is the Preferred
Supplier status. Here the service provider has been pre-
qualified which builds a minimum level of customer trust. The
vendor is assured a stream of business so some cost savings
materialize because of lower marketing expenses. There are
greater communications between the parties and the performance
measurements, while still being project focused, are defined.
The Alliance Partner represents the fully developed
relationship on the continuum. Here the partners view each
other as trusted stakeholders. The focus of the relationship
is on providing higher quality services while lowering the
cost structures of both partners. All cost improvement
opportunities are explored, there are extensive communications
between the partners and performance measurements are defined
in terms of total value (Agnello).
Obviously, the purpose of business is to earn a profit.
A business profit is the positive difference in the price a
customer will pay for a product or service (how much the
product or service is valued) and the cost (direct and
indirect) involved in making the product or providing the
service (Pappas and Hirschey, 10). Value is created if a
strategy yields efficiencies, reduces costs, improves quality
and effectiveness, or enhances bargaining power. A premise of
a recently published book on strategic alliances is the
prediction that the days of flat-out competition between
companies are over. Instead, companies are collaborating to
compete (Bleeke and Ernst, 5). Firms are discovering they can
create the highest value for customers and stakeholders by
selectively sharing control, costs, capital, access to
markets, information, and technology with competitors and
suppliers alike. Increasingly, corporations are turning to
strategic alliances as a way to achieve competitive advantages
in the pursuit of profits.
As corporations' strategies call for alliances to
increase competitive advantage, the theme will be communicated
throughout the organization. In order to work effectively
within the corporate framework, business units and staff
groups have to internalize, adapt, and reflect the mission,
direction and conduct of the corporation. Corporate real
estate unit managers will recognize and respond to the
situation.
STUDY QUESTION
Whether the real estate unit operates as a cost center or
a profit center, it has a primary responsibility to act in the
manner that maximizes value creation for the firm and the
shareholders (Joseph, 16). The question of this study is, how
and why do corporate real estate units use strategic alliances
with outside service providers to create value while meeting
the needs of the business units they serve?
PROPOSITIONS
Several study propositions have been listed below. Each
proposition is intended to direct attention to a specific area
of the study question that deserves special attention. In
addition, the propositions have been identified to help focus
the study in the right direction to maximize the learning
(Yin, 36).
A basic assumption of the propositions is that corporate
real estate managers who have selected to use strategic
alliances have done so to achieve a competitive advantage. It
is assumed there has been a careful and thoughtful analysis of
internal and external resources relative to the mission and
objective of the real estate unit before any strategic
alliance has been formed.
1. STAGE OF EVOLUTION OF THE CORPORATE REAL ESTATE UNIT
Corporate real estate groups that have evolved past the level
of tactical skills only (technical, analytic and problem-
solving) are able to articulate their strategic goals and can
identify how those strategies support the mission of the
corporation.
2. DETERMINATION OF CORE COMPETENCIES BY THE REAL ESTATE UNIT
Corporate real estate managers who enter strategic alliances
have determined their groups' core competencies and can
demonstrate a well considered process for identifying those
services best provided by outside resources.
3. PROCESS OF SELECTION OF STRATEGIC ALLIANCE PARTNERS
For real estate issues corporations select their strategic
alliance partners based on rigorous and formalized evaluation
processes to ensure they are partnering with the industry
leaders just as is done elsewhere in the corporation for other
business strategic alliances.
4. EXPECTATIONS OF BENEFITS OF STRATEGIC ALLIANCES
Corporate real estate managers who enter strategic alliances
typically expect:
4.1. To gain organizational flexibility to match
changing (and unpredictable) work loads;
4.2. To have top performers equipped with the
latest technologies and trained in the most
effective industry skills assigned to their
projects;
4.3. To have instant access to the best market
information;
4.4. To have services provided at below market
rates since the strategic partner does not
have to further compete for the corporation's
business.
Service providers who enter strategic alliances expect:
4.5. To have a long-term relationship with the
corporation carrying through industry cycles;
4.7. To have an exclusive agreement for a broad
range of services over a specified
geographical area;
4.8. To have current access to corporate
information that will affect real estate
issues;
4.9. To have frequent access to and regularly
scheduled conferences with the corporate
executive who manages the real estate group.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
TWO APPROACHES
This study started with research on the theories that
have been developed on the topic of strategic alliances. In
my review of the literature it became apparent that there are
two distinct emphases: structural and behavioral.
STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS
Through his work and writings during the past decade and
a half, Harvard University's Professor Michael E. Porter has
defined a structural model for dealing with strategy that has
significantly influenced the current generation of American
business managers. The concepts he has defined and the models
he has put forth have become part of the daily vocabulary of
business men and women when discussing their methods for
achieving success. It is possible the views and logic of
Porter's work represent the prevailing structural model for
strategic analysis.
FIVE FORCES
According to Porter, the essence of strategy formulation
is coping with competition. His theory is that competition in
an industry is rooted in its underlying economics. And, in
his view, customers, suppliers, potential entrants and
substitute products are all competitors. The degree of
competition from each depends on the particulars of the
industry. Porter's view of competition applies equally well
to industries dealing in services and to those selling
products. The general principles of his argument apply to all
types of businesses (Porter, 1980).
The state of competition in an industry depends on five
basis forces:
- Threat of entry
- Threat of substitutes
- Bargaining power of suppliers
Bargaining power of customers
- Intensity of rivalry
An important premise of Porter's theory of competitive
forces is that the collective strength of the five forces
ultimately determine the profit potential for an industry. A
"perfectly competitive" situation provides the worst prospect
for long term profitability.
Every industry is characterized by the fundamental
economic and technical structures that influence the
competitive forces of the industry. In order to chart a
successful strategy it is necessary for the strategist to
analyze and measure the strength and underlying source of
power of each of the forces. This knowledge will clarify the
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company's position in the industry and help identify where
strategic changes are likely to yield the greatest pay off.
Porter defined the characteristics of the five forces in
his essay.
THREAT OF ENTRY
New entrants to an industry cause a shake-up by bringing
new resources to bear in the fight for customers. The threat
of entry is countered by barriers to entry and the expected
reaction of existing competitors. There are six major
barriers to entry:
1. Economies of Scale - A significant capital
investment may be required to compete on the
large scale or else the new entrant will have to
accept a cost disadvantage.
2. Product Differentiation - Brand identification
creates a barrier by forcing entrants to spend
heavily to overcome customer loyalty.
3. Capital Requirements - The greater the financial
requirements to enter the industry, the smaller
will be the pool of likely entrants.
4. Cost Disadvantage Independent of Size - Some
entrenched companies have cost advantages not
available to aspirants such as favorable
locations, exclusive access to the best
supplier, patent rights, etc..
5. Access to Distribution Channels - A new
competitor to an industry faces the problem of
securing distribution of his service.
6. Government Policy - Certain industries face
significant government regulation and control
over the activities in the market-place.
In addition to the above points, a potential entrant must
also contemplate the reaction of the existing competitors.
Their ability and willingness to fight back must be recognized
and accounted for in the decision to enter.
SUBSTITUTE PRODUCT
Substitute products place a ceiling on the price that can
be charged for a product. This limiting factor will
ultimately lead to profit deterioration.
POWERFUL SUPPLIERS
Suppliers can exert bargaining power in an industry by
raising prices or reducing the quality of purchased goods.
The sources of power for suppliers are:
1. Few suppliers;
2. Unique or differentiated product;
3. Suppliers represent a credible threat to forward
integration;
4. The industry is not important to the suppliers.
POWERFUL BUYERS
Customers can force prices down, demand higher quality or
more service, or pit competitors against each other. The
sources of power for buyers are:
1. The products or services are standard;
2. The product or services is unimportant to the
quality of the buyers' products;
3. The product or service represents a significant
cost leading the buyer to shop for price;
4. The product or service does not save the buyer
money;
5. Buyers represent a credible threat to backward
integration.
INTENSITY OF RIVALRY
Rivalry is the competition that exists between existing
industry participants. The degree of intensity is determined
by:
1. The number and size of competitors;
2. The product lack of differentiation;
3. Capacity is normally augmented in large
increments;
4. Exit barriers are high.
With an assessment of the forces of competition and the
knowledge of his or her own company's strengths and
weaknesses, a strategist can formulate a plan of action.
Porter recommends three approaches. First, positioning the
company, accepts the structure of the industry as given. This
approach can be viewed as building defenses against
competitive forces or finding positions in the industry where
the forces are weakest. The second alternative, influencing
the balance, calls for applying external factors (new capital
investments, vertical integration) to alter the market. The
final approach, exploiting industry change, calls for
anticipating the future and pending changes in the forces of
competition brought about by industry evolution. By correctly
assessing the evolving situation, the strategist exploits
opportunities earlier than others.
GENERIC STRATEGIES
Another important contribution by Porter in the field of
strategy analysis deals with the concept of sustainable
competitive advantage. In Porter's view, there are two basic
types of competitive advantage: low cost or differentiation.
Cost advantage and differentiation are a function of the
industry structure and the firm's ability to cope with the
five forces better than its competitors do. The strengths and
weaknesses of a firm determine its relative cost or degree of
differentiation (Porter, 1985).
Porter's theory holds that the combination of the two
basic competitive advantages and the market scope the firm
chooses to compete in, results in a framework of three generic
strategies for achieving above average performance. The three
generic strategies are: cost leadership, differentiation, and
focus. The focus strategy has two variants, cost focus and
differentiation focus. The model is illustrated below.
COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE
THREE GENERIC STRATEGIESCOPTIVADNAG
LowerCost Differentiation
COMPETITIVE BroadTarget 1. CostLeadership 2. Differentiation
SCOPE 3A. Cost 3B. DifferentiationNarrowTargetFouFcs
Focus I Focus
The cost leadership and differentiation strategies are
applicable to a broad range of industry segments. The focus
strategies aim at either cost advantage or differentiation in
a narrow segment of the market.
The essence of Porter's theory of generic strategies is
that competitive advantage is the core of the firm's strategy.
In order to secure and sustain a competitive advantage, the
firm has to make a decision about the advantage it seeks and
the market range in which it will compete.
COST LEADERSHIP
Cost leadership is probably the most readily understood
generic strategy. The objective if this strategy is to become
the absolute low-cost producer in the industry. This is
achieved by finding and exploiting all sources of cost
advantages while maintaining parity or proximity in the bases
of differentiation to its competitors. Successful
implementation of this strategy allows the firm to earn an
above average return and it is particularly dependent on
preemption unless a technology change alters a competitor's
cost position. There can be only one cost leader in each
industry.
DIFFERENTIATION
The second generic strategy is differentiation which
means offering unique products that are relatively more
valuable to buyers. A firm that can achieve differentiation
will earn above average returns if its price premium exceeds
the extra cost of being unique. A strategy based on
differentiation requires the firm to achieve parity or
proximity of cost relative to its competitors. An industry
can support several differentiators provided each one features
a different unique attribute.
FOCUS
The third generic strategy is focus. The primary
distinction of the focus strategy is the firm selects a narrow
segment of the market as the target for its services. This
strategy rests on the premise that there are narrow segments
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within the industry that have unusual needs not well served by
either the industry cost leader or the existing differentiated
competitors. Firms that select to compete for these narrow
segments do so on the basis of cost focus or differentiation
focus. Focused firms are able to exploit the mismatch between
the narrow segment buyer's specific needs and the standard
offerings of the broad target based competitors. There is
often room in most industries for several focused competitors
provided each focuser chooses a different target segment.
STUCK IN THE MIDDLE
Porter describes the consequences for a firm that fails
to achieve any of the generic strategies as being one that is
"stuck in the middle." His prediction is that firms stuck in
the middle usually will be less profitable than rivals who
achieve one of the generic strategies. He does recognize a
stuck in the middle firm can earn attractive profits if its
industry is highly favorable or its competitors are also
stuck.
The concepts of the generic strategies identify several
ways to achieve competitive advantage while providing
alternative routes for earning above average returns. In
theory, if all competitors in an industry followed the
principles of competitive strategy, each would select a
different basis for its competitive advantage.
VALUE CHAIN
The need to capture the benefits of relationships between
businesses has never been more important. Technological
developments and common objectives already link many
businesses, and are creating new possibilities for
competitive advantage. To understand the role of relatedness
(synergy) in corporate strategy, Porter has developed the
notion of the value chain (Porter, 1990).
Every business performs a series of discrete activities
ranging from sourcing supplies to selling and servicing
products. The firm's value chain shows the interrelationship
among the activities. Porter identifies them as value
activities because it is at this level, not in the company as
a whole, that a business achieves competitive advantage.
Value is measured as the amount the customer's are willing to
pay for a company's product or service. The objective of
business is to create value that consistently exceeds the
company's cost of creating it. The value chain is a useful
framework for managers to measure how each value activity uses
information, technology and human resources as the work is
processed. Porter's model has nine categories. Primary
activities are directly related to the product (in-bound
logistics, operations, out-bound logistics, marketing and
sales, and service). Support activities provide the input and
infrastructure that allow the primary activities to occur
(firm infrastructure, human resource management, technology
28
development, and procurement). Because the value activities
collectively define the company's competence, they
subsequently determine its competitive advantage. By closely
analyzing the value chain, managers seek to identify sources
of cost advantage or product differentiation. Similarly
examining a competitor's value chain helps clarify
organizational differences that can be exploited for
competitive advantage.
Effectively using the value chain concept requires a
careful examination of all activities a firm does, and those
its competitors do, and considering how things can change
(Bhambri, 49). Typical questions to consider are:
- Can an activity be performed differently?
- Can a group of linked activities be reordered?
- Can coalitions with other firms lower costs?
Porter's value chain model helps explain how synergy is
created in one of two ways. First, if two companies have
similar value chains, there is the opportunity to share
activities. For example, two businesses can share the same
logistics network. Second, companies can transfer skills or
expertise among similar value chains. This second type of
synergy will only create a competitive advantage if three
conditions are met:
1. The shared expertise is meaningful because the
activities are very similar;
2. The transferred skills pertain to activities
important to a competitive advantage;
3. The transferred skills are advanced and
proprietary enough to be beyond the capability
of competitors.
According to Porter:
"Both the strategic logic and the experience of the
companies I have studied over the last decade
suggest that a company will create shareholder
value through diversification to a greater and
greater extent as it moves from portfolio
management. Because they do not rely on superior
insight or other questionable assumptions about the
company's capabilities, sharing activities and
transferring skills offer the best avenues for
value creation."
The transfer of skills is an active process that
significantly changes the strategy of the receiving unit. To
be successful it requires the participation and support of
high level management.
BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS
Toward the end of the 1980s a second approach for
studying corporate strategy was developed by C.K. Prahalad and
Gary Hamel. Their view emphasizes the behavioral aspect of
strategic activities.
CORE COMPETENCIES
Traditionally, a company's competitiveness depended on
it's ability to deliver products or service at either a price
lower than the competition or with performance attributes that
others were unable to provide. Globalization and rapid
technological advances are tending to eliminate the ability of
companies to differentiate on either of those two measures.
Prahalad and Hamel point out that:
"In the long run, competitiveness derives from an
ability to build at lower cost and more speedily
than competitors, the core competencies that spawn
unanticipated products" (Prahalad and Hamel, 79-
91).
They reason that the most important advantage will be the
ability to consolidate corporate-wide technologies and
production skills into competencies which can be quickly
adapted to changing opportunities in the market-place.
Prahalad and Hamel defined three tests that can be used
for identifying the core competencies in a company. First,
the core competence provides potential access to a wide
variety of markets. Second, it should make a significant
contribution to the perceived customer benefits. And finally,
the core competence should be difficult for competitors to
imitate. Their argument is it will be difficult for competi-
tors to imitate especially if the core competence is a complex
harmonization of individual technologies and production
skills.
Core competencies should be thought of as the collective
learning in the organization. The concept is especially
applicable to how the organization coordinates diverse
production skills and integrates multiple streams of
technologies. It is about the organization of work and the
delivery of value including communication, involvement and the
ability to work across organizational boundaries. And, core
competencies do not diminish with use. They are enhanced as
they are applied and shared.
The metaphor the Prahalad and Hamel use to describe their
theory of core competence is that a corporation is like a tree
which grows from its roots. Core competencies are like the
roots of the tree. Two or three core competencies join
together to form core products which are likened to the truck
of the tree. From the truck spreads the branches of the tree
that can be thought of as the business units of the corpora-
tion. Finally the business units offer the end products of
the corporation to the market-place which in the metaphor are
thought of as the fruit of the tree.
An interesting point of their theory is that the embedded
skills that give rise to the next generation of products
cannot be "rented out" by outsourcing without surrendering
core competencies.
"Outsourcing can provide a shortcut to a more
competitive product, but it typically contributes
little to the people-embedded skills that are
needed to sustain market-place leadership... When
it comes to core competencies, it is difficult to
get off the train, walk to the next station, and
then reboard" (Prahalad and Hamel, 79-91).
Prahalad and Hamel recommend that core competencies are
the source of new business development.
"Managers have to win manufacturing leadership in
core products and capture global share through
brand-building programs aimed at exploiting
economies of scope. Only if a company is conceived
of as a hierarchy of core competencies, core
products, and market focused business units will it
be fit to fight."
CAPABILITIES-BASED COMPETITION
An extension of the core competence theory and an
addition to the behavioral approach was recently written by
George Stalk, Philip Evans and Lawrence Shulman (Stalk, 57-
69). This new concept of corporate strategy is called
"capabilities-based competition. " The authors argue the
success of the nation's largest retailer, Wal-Mart, is based
on a set of strategic business decisions that transformed the
company into a capabilities-based competitor. Wal-Mart
employs a logistics technique known as "cross-docking" that
the authors claim represents the fullest expression of this
strategic vision. Cross-docking is a highly coordinated
material handling system that allows Wal-Mart to achieve
economies by purchasing full truckloads of goods while
avoiding storage and handling costs. Goods are continuously
delivered to Wal-Marts warehouses where they are repacked and
dispatched to retail stores. Often the goods do not spend
time in the warehouse, instead they flow in one loading dock
and out another. The economies are passed along to customers
in the form of lower retail prices. Cross-docking was made
possible by Wal-Mart making strategic investments in a variety
of interlocking support systems. Judged individually on
conventional ROI (return on investment) criteria, these
logistics investments could not be justified.
The authors identified four principles of capabilities-
based competition:
"1. The building blocks of corporate strategy
are not products and markets but business
processes;
2. Competitive success depends on transforming
a company's key processes into strategic
capabilities that consistently provide
superior value to the customer;
3. Companies create these capabilities by
making strategic investments in a support
infrastructure that links together and
transcends traditional SBUs and functions;
4. Because capabilities necessarily cross
functions, the champion of a capabilities-
based strategy is the CEO" (Stalk, 57-69).
In today's more dynamic business environment, it should
be expected that strategy has to become correspondingly more
dynamic. The authors describe the business competition today
is a "war of movement." Success depends on a company's
ability to anticipate market trends and formulate quick
responses to changing customer needs.
"Successful competitors move quickly in and out of
products, markets, and sometimes even entire
businesses - a process more akin to an interactive
video game than to chess. In such an environment,
the essence of strategy is not the structure of a
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company's products and markets but the dynamics of
its behavior. And, the goal is to identify and
develop the hard-to-imitate organizational
capabilities that distinguish a company from its
competitors in the eyes of the customers" (Stalk,
57-69).
The theory for competing on capabilities is that a
capability is strategic only when it begins and ends with the
customer. The combination of many processes becomes the
organizational capability. The irony of this theory is the
longer and more complex the string of business processes, the
harder it is to transform them into a capability. But the
reward is, once the capability is constructed it will be
harder for the competition to imitate it.
Just as many companies are looking to outside suppliers
to perform non-core activities, capabilities-based competitors
are integrating vertically. This is a strategy for gaining
synergy by integrating businesses that perform related
activities directly upstream or downstream of your business.
Firms that integrate vertically are trying to ensure they have
direct control of key business processes.
One of the significant features of capabilities is that
they are collective and cross-functional. Every capability is
a small part of many people's jobs. Capabilities are not a
large part of a few people's jobs. It is the primary agenda
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of the Chief Executive Officer because only he or she can
focus the entire company's attention on creating capabilities
that serve customers.
Becoming a capabilities-based competitor requires the
following actions:
- Shift the strategic framework to achieve
aggressive goals;
- organize around the chosen capability and
make sure the employees have the necessary
skills and resources to achieve it;
- Make progress visible and bring measurements
and reward into alignment;
- Do not delegate the leadership of the
transformation.
The authors argue that capabilities are often mutually
exclusive so choosing the right one is the essence of
strategy.
According to Stalk et al, competencies and capabilities
represent two different but related aspects of an emerging
model for corporate strategy. Both concepts emphasize the
behavioral aspects of strategy in contract to the structural
model defined by Porter. Core competence is the combination
of individual technologies and production skills that allow a
company to successfully compete. The distinction between core
competencies and capabilities is that core competence
emphasizes technological and production expertise at specific
points along the value chain, while capabilities take in the
entire value chain. Because of this distinction, capabilities
are visible to the customer, whereas core competencies rarely
are.
COMPARE AND CONTRAST
The structural analysis approach to strategy formulation
rests on the premise that an industry's competitiveness is a
function of underlying economics and several measurable
attributes of industry participants. A successful strategy
requires evaluation of the five forces that collectively
determine the situation. Armed with data the strategist
selects to position the company where the forces are weakest;
influence the balance by applying new, external factors; or
exploit changes by anticipating the future. Then, by using a
generic strategy (low cost, differentiation or focus), the
company can earn an above average return.
In contrast, the behavioral approach contends
globalization and rapid technological advances are eliminating
the ability to compete on low cost or differentiation.
Rather, competitiveness depends on the collective learning of
the organization and the people-embedded skills known as core
competencies. Core competencies allow the company to quickly
adapt to changes and respond to new market opportunities.
Core competencies have wide market application, contribute to
perceived customer benefits and are difficult for competitors
to imitate. The theory of capabilities-based competition
contends the building blocks of corporate strategy are the
processes that create value which can be passed on to the
customer. The processes are collective and cross-functional.
Corporate strategy determines the business or businesses
the company will be involved in. It establishes the unity of
purpose of the organization. According to Kenneth R. Andrews:
"Although it evolves with the development of
markets, company strengths, and institutional
values, corporate strategy marks out a deliberately
chosen direction, and governs directly the
investment decisions, organization structure,
incentive systems, and indeed the essential
character of the company" (Montgomery, 451).
A business unit strategy is less comprehensive than the
company as a whole; it identifies the product or service and
the market in which the business unit will compete (Weremiuk,
7). Business unit strategy is more concerned with market
position versus the higher level concepts that are the domain
of corporate strategy. It is at the business unit level where
value creating activities are most identifiable. Consequently,
it is at the business unit level where strategic alliances are
most likely to be found; in either primary activities or
support activities.
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CHAPTER 3
STRATEGIC ALLIANCE
USING STRATEGIC ALLIANCES
In a strategic alliance, organizations work and cooperate
out of mutual need and they agree to share the risks in
striving to achieve a common objective. In PARTNERSHIPS FOR
PROFIT, Jordan D. Lewis provides insight in structuring and
managing strategic alliances. His premise is cooperation
among firms is changing the business world. Cooperation is
growing and is here to stay because of globalization and the
rise of technology. According to a September 21, 1992 FORTUNE
article "ARE STRATEGIC ALLIANCES WORKING", alliances have
become an integral part of contemporary strategic thinking
(Sherman, 78). To highlight this trend, the article cites
information from David Ernst and Joel Bleeke of the McKinsey
management consultant firm that the rate of joint venture
formation between U.S. companies and international partners
has been growing by 27% annually since 1985. (Note: In the
referenced article the terms joint venture and strategic
alliance are used as synonyms. Usually, however, a joint
venture is considered to be a jointly owned but independent
organization of two or more separate parent firms while a
strategic alliance does not necessarily involve the formation
of a new, independent entity).
When the management of a company determines it is in the
firm's best interest to expand its business into new product
lines or new geographic areas, it is necessary to select a
strategy for doing so. According to Lewis, there are four
ways to build strength: internal growth, acquisition, arm's
length transactions and strategic alliances (Lewis, 19). The
decision making process for choosing depends on the resources
and risks involved and the need for control of the activity.
Acquisitions Arm's Length Strategic Alliances
Internal Activities Transactions
Scope
Control
Risks
" Core strengths e Closely related * Cannot add e Add competitive
to core strengths competitive edge strength
- Need most of * Limited by risks e Most extensive
purchased firm others willingly access to
take alone outside resources
" Full e Full * Via initial terms e Ongoing mutual
adjustments
* Taken alone * Taken by buyer * Taken separately - Shared
Through strategic alliances, firms can combine resources
to meet individual and collective objectives and control of
the alliance can be negotiated between the partners to arrive
at the balance point. However, McKinsey's study suggests the
best results are achieved when one or the other following
alternatives is selected: Either give one partner sole control
or set up an independent operation that is directed by its own
board (Sherman, 78).
Lewis outlines several advantages associated with
strategic alliances. First, with alliances, firms can achieve
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the same economy of scale as industry giants. Second, as the
cost of research and development spiral upward, companies are
finding it increasingly more difficult to individually remain
the source of their own technological vitality. Forming a
strategic alliance can provide a company access to a new
technology ahead of its competitors. Third, competitive
advantage is now judged by the combination of abilities of
companies versus a company's individual strengths. The
combined power of strong corporations allows easier
penetration in new markets and quick movement to dominant
positions. Lewis points out that through strategic alliances
opportunity exists for structuring exclusive commitments with
suppliers of critical capabilities which effectively places
those resources beyond the reach of your competitors.
Additionally, Lewis notes that alliances increase the level of
competition by strengthening firms and easing market entry at
home and abroad. This adds pressure for each firm to focus
more tightly on its core strengths. This focus makes it
easier to maintain the needed investment scale in those core
competencies to enhance the firm's ability to stay at the
frontier of the technology. And having this sharp focus in
turn helps a corporation win new partners.
As corporate real estate managers plan their work for
achieving the property goals of their companies, they should
evaluate various combinations of internal and external
resources. Depending on the particulars of the situation
being evaluated and for specific facets of the work,
strategic alliances may be used to help lower costs, spread
risks, or release internal resources for other more critical
activities.
RELATED TREND
CBC/Madison's William Agnello noted an interesting
related trend where two or more service providers have chosen
to join forces to collaborate through strategic alliances as
a way to further differentiate the combination of services
they offered together to the market.
According to Agnello, to enhance their ability to provide
the high quality service demanded in the market, real estate
service providers have retrenched and focused their attention
on selected skills that set them apart from other competitors.
Meanwhile, because of the restructuring that has occurred
throughout corporate America, their customers at the corporate
real estate units demanded a wider range of services. Agnello
noted three alternatives available to service providers to
meet this paradox: they could acquire capital to support
internal growth; they could merge with another firm and form
a new, bigger organization; or they could join strategic
alliances with firms that offer complimentary services. In
his view, the strategic alliance option offered service
providers the best ability to leverage organizational
resources for marketing, sales and the pursuit of new business
opportunities. Agnello said:
"In the past to be successful in real estate
required control of three things: location;
location and location. Now, the key to success in
real estate will depend on your ability to deliver
three new things: service; service; and service."
The general framework for strategic alliances among
service providers he described was much more than a loose
agreement for cross referrals. It was an situation where two
organizations, each with a different core competence, would
join forces to create a new capability unavailable elsewhere
in the marketplace. A successful strategic alliance between
service providers required companies with compatible cultures
and operating styles and the leadership of each company to
believe strategic alliances were vital to insure future
success (Agnello).
ALIGNING REAL ESTATE WITH CORPORATE STRATEGY
Corporate real estate managers need to work in ways that
help their companies deal with the structural changes being
brought about by the forces of globalization. Also, as
technological advances continue to make information and data
more readily available in real-time, real estate managers need
to determine what data to collect and analyze to improve the
quality of decision making on real estate issues. The
corporate real estate situation is changing due to the on-
going devaluation of real property, high vacancy rates, and
corporate downsizing. Corporate real estate executives will
be challenged to ensure the firm's real estate assets match
the overall corporate strategy ("The Changing Roles...", 7).
A facilities and real estate strategy review should be
structured to provide information that will help corporate
planners find the optimal match among corporate business units
and available or planned facilities (Wilson, 26).
FIVE STAGES OF EVOLUTION
Depending on the size and nature of the corporation and
the level of sophistication of the corporate real estate
group, it can be expected a company's real estate strategy
will be designed to match the overall corporate strategy. A
significant part of the research presented in the Corporate
Real Estate 2000 report "Strategic Management of Fifth
Resource: Corporate Real Estate" deals with the model which
describes the evolution of capabilities of corporate real
estate staffs. The CRE 2000 researchers identified five
stages of development and named them: 1. Taskmaster; 2.
Controller; 3. Dealmaker; 4. Intrapreneur; and 5. Business
Strategist (Joroff, 26). According to the model, the mission
and objective of real estate unit will evolve to match the
needs of the corporation. As the real estate unit evolves, it
advances to successive stages of development from a technical
orientation to a strategic effort.
TASKMASTER
This stage of organizational development is characterized
by the unit's focus on technical issues involving building
maintenance and cost cutting. The real estate unit is not
integrated with larger corporate issues, the posture of the
organization is reactionary to the initiatives of other
business groups throughout the corporation. And most
significantly, the researchers believe the Taskmaster stage
appears to be value-neutral.
CONTROLLER
For senior management to recognize the potential costs
and benefits that the company's real estate portfolio
represents, the real estate unit must have the analytical
skills of the Controller stage. Having command of the facts
and details associated with operating costs, allocation
formulas, depreciation charges as well as the ability to
analyze and compare the company's real estate performance with
industry experience is the measure of success at this stage.
The work done in the Controller stage is illustrated in
an article written by Joel Parker. Introducing a new
corporate system for how occupancy costs are collected and
charged to the business units is a task that requires careful
planning (Parker, 22-25). The primary objective of an
occupancy-cost system should be to support the corporation's
strategic objectives. But, business units are apt to resist
changes to the system of definitions and allocations because
changes may diminish their profitability. To ensure
acceptance of the new system by the corporate business units
it must be perceived as objective. The prospects for
acceptance will be improved if the new system has been worked
out in a process that builds internal company consensus.
DEALMAKER
The feature that best describes the Dealmaker stage of
development is the focus on market value. When the real
estate unit moves into this stage its mission becomes one of
seizing opportunities to create value. The skills that are
most important to the Dealmaker are problem-solving abilities.
The real estate unit will take a more proactive approach to
working with other business units to standardize building
usage and optimize real estate needs with company needs.
An example of the Dealmaker stage was the experience of
Digital Equipment Corporation. The Digital sales and service
organization for the state of Connecticut decided to
consolidate its operation from 7 locations to 1 central
office. This represented a need for 80,000 square feet.
Digital wanted to lease the space but it also wanted to
capture some of the value represented by the lease. DaQui
Belding Partnership, a Hartford, Connecticut real estate
developer, and Digital formed a joint venture. Digital took
a 40% minority position. The joint venture bought a building
pad in DaQui Belding's office park and developed a 160,000
square foot office building. Digital signed a long term lease
with the joint venture for half of the building at just under
market rents. The remainder of the building was leased at
market rates.
INTRAPRENEUR
When corporate real estate units evolve to the
Intrapreneur stage they begin to operate more like an
independent real estate company would and it is not unusual
for the unit to start acting as a profit center. The emphasis
on performance shifts to benchmarking services and costs
against two measures; outside suppliers and competitors. The
real estate unit becomes very involved in the business
planning process. Usually, a direct organizational connection
is established with the Chief Financial Officer.
The Hobbs Brook Office Park in Waltham, Massachusetts was
started in 1955 and is claimed to be the first suburban office
park in Boston. The start of its development preceded
construction of Route 128, the famous Technology Highway that
circles most of Boston. Today, there are eight buildings at
the park with more than a million square feet of office space.
Many of the nation's leading businesses are leaseholders at
Hobbs Brook. Hobbs Brook is owned by Middlesex Mutual
Building Trust, the corporate real estate operation for and a
wholly owned subsidiary of Arkwright Mutual Insurance Company.
MMBT is managed as a real estate business with its own balance
sheet and financial reporting requirements. The manager of
MMBT reports directly to the Arkwright senior vice president
in charge of investments.
BUSINESS STRATEGIST
As Business Strategists, real estate executives operating
in Stage 5 will look beyond real estate issues. They will be
concerned with the larger business trends influencing the
corporations strategic advantage, productivity and stakeholder
value. The researchers note the mission of the real estate
unit will be to convene the work force. An important skill
will be the ability to create real estate strategies that are
fully integrated with the global initiatives of the business
units.
One example of the close alignment of the real estate
function with corporate strategy is the experience of the
Eastman Kodak Company (Russell, 42). Kodak is convinced it
can create the most value by looking at their real estate -
land, buildings and space - as a financial asset. They use
their real estate assets to create value, and they run their
real estate operations as a business. The Kodak corporate
real estate office, CREO, is operated as a "not-for-profit
profit business." CREO's objective is not only to provide
real estate solutions but to examine how it can improve the
return on assets, to look at cash flow, and to evaluate the
operating performance of the company's business units.
NEW SKILLS REQUIRED
In the future, corporations will continue the trend of
cutting back on staff size to reduce fixed costs and become
more competitive. Accordingly, the role of the corporate real
estate function in the future will have different
characteristics. Radding makes the case that the smaller real
estate departments will be led by senior employees skilled in
finance, accounting and integrative planning with other
business units (Radding, 56-73).
In a recent article, several industry executives stated
their views on the growing importance of strategic planning in
the corporate real estate arena (Jaben, 79).
Jones Lang Wooten's Steven Scruggs, director of corporate
services for New York, was quoted as saying that the corporate
real estate departments have become:
"a more integral part of the strategic process,
requiring greater skills of the people there."
According to John F. Powers, senior managing director of
Edward S. Gordon Company in New York:
"The emphasis will move to people in corporate real
estate who understand their organizations
and what they need and who understand the market
for service providers. Thus, they'll be well-
educated buyers of real estate services rather than
practitioners."
In the view of Steven F. Pope, executive vice president
of Commercial Investment Real Estate Institute:
"You'll find a different kind of person getting
into corporate real estate. It was disposition or
acquisition people. Now the person will need
financial analysis skills. The level of
sophistication is increasing."
The five stage model illustrates how the real estate unit
evolves as it becomes more closely aligned with the activities
of corporate management. The transformation is marked by a
shift from a real estate orientation to a business focus. The
corporate real estate group becomes increasingly concerned
with corporate productivity, competitive advantage and
shareholder value. The CRE 2000 researchers observed the use
of strategic alliances by corporate real estate units begins
when the criteria for performance shifts to benchmarks found
in the market-place. This shift occurs at Stage 4, the
Intrapreneur stage. The use of strategic alliances was also
observed by real estate units that operated at the Business
Strategist level of Stage 5.
MOTIVATIONS AND RISKS
MOTIVATIONS FOR ENTERING STRATEGIC ALLIANCES
One of the greatest appeals of strategic alliances is
that the combination of resources that can be achieved is open
to wide range of possibilities. For example, entrepreneur
Ruth Owades recently founded Calyx & Corolla, a flower catalog
business that guarantees next-day delivery of high quality,
fresh cut flower arrangements exactly as described in the
catalog. The flowers are shipped directly from the grower to
the recipient so they are 6 to 10 days on average fresher than
those ordered from a local florist (Brokaw, 96-104). What
makes this example interesting is that when she created this
strategic alliance with several flower growers and Federal
Express, the overnight delivery company, entrepreneur Owades
didn't even have a company.
Alliances are not tools of convenience. What makes an
alliance perform effectively is the faith of both parties that
they will be stronger together than either one is separately
(Ohmae, 143-154). Each partner contributes skills and
abilities the other lacks. In effect, business has become a
team sport rather than an individual event (Bleeke and Ernst,
54).
Insightful research on the advantages of strategic
alliances has been performed by several academicians and
practicing professionals. During my thesis research I read
several articles and books where the benefits and risks of
strategic alliances were discussed. The Lewis work on these
issues was very helpful. The following several pages
summarize some of those important concepts with
acknowledgement to the original authors. Partnering provides
the ability to:
- Focus on core competencies - In today's business
context, probably the primary reason firms decide
to enter strategic alliances is they had previously
decided to re-focus the company's resources on its
own core competencies. By deciding what skills and
processes it has mastered (and through which it
achieves competitive advantage), the organization
can then partner for everything else (Crouse, 5;
Lewis,25).
- Leverage internal investments - Managers are
continuously faced with the problem of making
decisions about the allocation of limited
resources. By deciding to join strategic alliances
to have certain required products or services
provided by others, there will be fewer competing
interests within the firm contending for a share of
finite corporate resources (Crouse, 7; Lewis, 25).
- Leverage core competencies of others - Service
providers who join strategic resources hope to be
able to achieve economies of scale by increasing
the utilization factors of its organization. When
these economies of scale are realized, the cost of
producing the service or product will be lowered so
the price they charge can be reduced (Crouse, 7).
Overcome market entry barriers - Probably the
classical business reason for entering a strategic
alliance is to gain access to closed markets.
Whether the barrier is due to government
restrictions, local market conditions, lack of
geographic coverage or some other situation,
alliances with established insiders have often
provided the missing key to success (Crouse, 8;
Lewis, 36).
- Reduce operating costs - The trend for companies
to re-focus on core competencies has resulted in a
significant loss of employment in corporations.
This is especially true in those functional areas
that are not directly related to the core
competencies. The ability to enter strategic
alliances with outside service providers has given
corporations significant latitude in the ability to
reduce operating staffs while still being able to
obtain the needed level of service (Lewis, 46).
- Broaden product or service offerings - Other
firms may be in a position to offer support for the
product or service your organization provides.
Joining forces with those firms helps add value to
your customer by expanding the range of service you
offer (Crouse,7; Lewis, 33).
- Create synergy - Creating well-considered
strategic alliances achieves a synergy that could
lead to additional benefits. When two
organizations are aligned for mutual gain they
become more aware of each other's strengths. Over
time they begin to seek new opportunities for
additional gain (Lewis, 48).
- Gain flexibility for changing markets - Joining
forces with another organization offers the
opportunity for increased organizational capability
for responding to changing demands from the market
being served. The flexibility is present on two
counts; capacity for changing work loads and wider
range of capabilities for dealing with variations
of services required (Crouse, 8; Lewis, 36).
- Spread risk - By allowing each partner to focus
on its own specialty, strategic alliances reduce
operating errors thus reducing the risk of failure.
In the event of a failure, the partners share the
consequences so the effects are lessened than if
one party had to bear the responsibility alone
(Crouse, 8).
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- Improve quality - Quality improvement is one of
the benefits that can be realized by using
strategic alliances. Essentially, by joining
forces with a selected provider in a long-term
commitment and with a mutual reliance on success,
there is an enhanced environment for raising the
standards of quality of the product or service
(Crouse, 8).
- Gain access to advanced technologies - Presumably
the partner selected to participate in the
strategic alliance has superior competencies in its
area of expertise. By extension, the technologies
and processes used by the partner are expected to
be the most advanced forms used in that industry.
By entering strategic alliances a company can
anticipate having access to the advanced
technologies of its partner as they are applied for
the common objectives of the alliance (Lewis, 41).
* Provide competition to in-house developers - As
managers join strategic alliances for selected
aspects of the business and benefits accrue, the
propensity will be to find other opportunities for
application of the technique throughout the
organization. This "threat of substitution" will
often encourage existing staff groups to achieve
higher levels of productivity and efficiency to
56
protect their employment (Crouse, 8). Notice the
recent example where the Massachusetts Bay Transit
Authority took competitive bids from its own repair
shop as well as outside service providers for
refurbishing buses. Without threat of competition
the cost for refurbishing each bus in the MBTA shop
was $101,000. When the process was opened to
outside competition the MBTA shop manager was able
to able to re-examine the process and submit a
fixed price bid of $80,000. The low bid was
$59,500 per vehicle from the Midwest Bus Rebuilders
Corporation. MBTA officials decided to have 40
buses refurbished by the less expensive Michigan
contractor and eight buses rehabilitated by its own
union workers (Palmer, 33).
Strategic alliances have become an integral and
responsible part of every corporate strategist's repertoire.
They are not merely tools of convenience but rather very
important instruments in serving customer's needs in a global
environment (Ohmae, 143-154).
RISKS OF STRATEGIC ALLIANCES
Strategic alliances are increasingly being used in
business because of the many advantages they offer. However,
there are certain drawbacks that managers should keep in mind.
- Shared control - Using the definition of
cooperation among two parties while sharing risk to
achieve common objective, an inherent feature of
strategic alliances is the need for shared decision
making. Americans are used to acquisition and
control yet strategic alliance means sharing
control (Ohmae, 143-154; Sherman, 78). The cost
which managers must be willing to pay for the
benefits of working in a partnership is the lack of
control that will be associated it.
- Implementation issues - Merging two organizations
will require managerial capabilities for dealing
with unexpected events. To ensure the smooth
implementation of a cooperative strategy decision
makers must carefully address four considerations
before entering into substantive discussions with
the partner (Lorange and Roos, 25-30). To be
successful certain political consideration need to
be recognized. The people in organizations that
will be combined must be convinced of the benefits
and not feel threatened by the change. And the
strategic benefits have to be clearly recognized.
Giving sufficient thought to several aspects of
each of these considerations will help the
cooperation evolve harmoniously over time without
conflicting with other strategic concerns of either
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partner.
- Protect core competencies - Collaboration may be
necessary to achieve a desired results and close
cooperation will be required in a strategic
alliance. But the skills or processes that
distinguish your company from your competitors
represent your "crown jewels" (according to Lei and
Slocum) and they must be protected at all costs.
Otherwise, there will be no reason for one or the
other of you to continue and competitive forces
will lead to the elimination of the weaker party.
Firms that rely on strategic alliances as an
outsourcing mechanism to secure access to
competitive products may find their internal skill
sets deteriorating as they become "locked out" from
learning new skills and technologies critical to
participating in industry evolution. Alliances can
be used as an indirect strategic weapon to slowly
"deskill" a partner who does not understand the
inherent risks. All alliance mechanisms create
direct and indirect windows of opportunity for
gaining access to a partner's skills, technologies,
core competencies, and even strategic direction
(Lei and Slocum, 8-97).
- Safeguard important relationships - It is
probably not possible to evaluate the importance of
current information in business transactions. The
sources of information, customers, colleagues, and
suppliers, are highly valuable commodities for
business people and they need to be nurtured and
not compromised as a result of strategic alliances
(Lewis, 53).
Managers ability to deal with cultural differences
between the two partners companies will enhance the success
rate for business partnerships (Sonnenberg, 49). These and
other dangers associated with strategic alliances should be
considered before making commitments to joining forces with
outside firms. The next section will examine how, under
certain conditions, corporate real estate groups organize and
conduct their work to meet the strategic objectives of the
corporation.
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CHAPTER 4
NORTH AMERICAN GOOD FOOD CASE
North American Good Food (NAGF), a pseudonym for this
case report, was one of several operating companies that
comprised a global consumer products company which
manufactured and marketed food, beer and tobacco brands around
the world. The global company's objective was to answer daily
consumer needs for low-priced, high-volume, quality products.
The 1992 revenues for the global company were nearly $60
billion. All operating companies earned positive income in
1992. 1992 revenues for NAGF was approximately $20 billion
and income was more than $2.5 billion. NAGF's real estate
portfolio included over 1,000 owned and leased properties
throughout North America (Hiller).
CORPORATE STRATEGY
In 1993 the overall corporate mission of the parent
company was to be the most successful consumer packaged goods
company in the world. The strategies for achieving that
mission called for managing with a global perspective, hiring
and developing the highest quality employees, protecting and
building brand loyalty, maximizing productivity, and expanding
its Total Quality Management concept. The corporate culture
emphasized sales and marketing leadership, and strong
financial performance with decisions based on economic
considerations. Because they were involved in distinct
businesses, each operating company was managed independently.
OPERATIONAL CHANGES
By the early 1990s, the NAGF real estate unit had been in
operation for 50 years. The size of the real estate portfolio
was awesome, 53 million square feet. In approximate terms,
NAGF owned 300 properties (42 msf) and leased 770 properties
(11 msf). The product mix was manufacturing, 57%;
warehousing, 20%; office, 15%; and retail (and other), 8%.
This hugh portfolio triggered 200 to 250 real estate
transactions every year. The corporate real estate unit
provided services to approximately 20 business units. Its
strategy was to help the business units by securing real
estate at the lowest attainable marginal cost. The corporate
real estate unit and the work it performed was supervised by
a vice president who directed four managers. Each manager was
responsible for a different function and in total they were
supported by a group of 14 professionals and 4 administrative
support people.
In 1991 NAGF decided to incorporate strategic alliances
to the management of its real estate portfolio. The primary
objective was to concentrate its volume of business with a
small number of service providers so NAGF would receive cost
breaks due to the volume discount theory. This was consistent
with how other NAGF departments were dealing with the demands
62
of higher competitive pressures in the global market-place.
Other objectives were to improve the quality of services to
the business units; increase administrative efficiencies;
reduce transaction costs; and have the real estate department
professionals focus on strategic issues that would create
value for NAGF.
By 1993 the Strategic Supplier Alliance program had been
in place for one year and the real estate unit at NAGF had
changed significantly. The title of the person in charge of
the real estate unit was changed from Vice President of Real
Estate and Financial Services to Assistant Treasurer for Real
Estate Services. His staff had been reduced to two
professional managers. The level of service provided to the
business units had not changed. There were still more than
200 transactions to be performed annually. What changed was
that two service providers, both were nationally recognized
full service real estate firms, had been brought on as
Strategic Supplier Alliance (SSA) partners to do the
transactional work.
FINDING PARTNERS
NAGF was interested in identifying 2 SSA partners who
would do real estate brokerage, tenant representation, and
real estate development tasks throughout North America. The
process for selecting SSA partners took 8 months and included
evaluating 30 candidates. These candidate firms were judged
on their commitment to and capability for dealing with all
aspects of the NAGF real estate portfolio; having a national
account capability; being a recognized industry leader and
having no conflict of interest. Based on these judgments the
field of candidates was reduced from 30 to 6.
NAGF next issued Requests for Proposals to six firms.
The responses were rated on five key areas: strategic
commitment; capabilities; administrative and financial support
systems; professionalism; and, fee splitting arrangement
(mechanism for volume discount). Two firms were contracted to
be Strategic Service Alliance partners in 1992. One of the
factors that caused the selection of these two firms was the
location of their respective headquarters, San Francisco and
New York, correlated with the locations where NAGF had its
second and third highest concentrations of properties. NAGF
has balanced the work load between the two partners.
BENEFITS
The strategic alliances delivered several benefits to
NAGF. The fee splitting arrangement provided a new source of
income to NAGF. Since they were guaranteed a level of annual
business, the SSA partners agreed to rebate a portion of their
commission payments to NAGF. A schedule was agreed to that
called a no profit sharing (between NAGF and the SSA partner)
on small transactions up to a threshold value for commissions
earned on a deal. For transactions where the threshold was
exceeded, the commission was split with NAGF on a three-tier
basis. The greater the commission, the greater the share NAGF
received.
Next, service response time improved because there was
increased organizational capability for responding to business
units' demands. The quality of service improved due to the
application of standard operating procedures for all
transactions, large or small.
As part of the RFP process and to define its expectations
from the SSA partners, the NAGF real estate unit created an
operations guidebook for the first time in its history which
defined and recorded the NAGF business methods for real estate
transactions. Quality performance of the SSA partners was
measured on every transaction by the business unit person
being served. The report was an evaluation from 1 to 10 on
twelve measures: knowledge of the assignment; communications;
professionalism; market knowledge; delivery; quality of work;
flexibility; planning; problem-solving; personality; ethics;
and overall performance.
Weekly reports were filed electronically by the SSA
partners on every assignment. This up-to-the-minute
information was available to all business unit customers
through the NAGF electronic mail system. The updates reported
all the specific project information and current project
schedule information in a proscribed format. It also included
a notes file that listed all the relevant and timely
information about the current situation. This system was an
example of "informating" as defined by Zuboff (Joroff, 71).
The Lori Verner (not her real name) was the manager for
corporate accounts at a regional office in a large full
service real estate company. She was the account manager for
the NAGF strategic alliance and she identified how the
arrangement helped her firm. She noted the fact that the
strategic alliance represented a steady stream of repeat
business for which she did not have to market the firm; a big
benefit. Also, the ability to claim their partnership with an
industry leader such as NAGF was a positive feature for the
firm's other business development efforts. And, as the trust
and team spirit grew over time, the transaction process became
more structured and routinized. This allowed the service
provider team the ability to concentrate more fully on
enhancing the economics of each deal as well as the
opportunity to negotiate for non-economic, tenant friendly
considerations (Verner).
Verner also noted that the process and the RFP used by
NAGF was so well organized and so well conceived, she was
noticing significant similarities in more recently issued RFPs
coming from other corporations who were also organizing
strategic alliances.
FUTURE EXPECTATIONS
Having the strategic alliances up and operating for the
routine transactions, the time and talent of the real estate
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department has been focused on value-added opportunities. For
example, multiple property locations in a given city can be
closely evaluated to identify possible advantages by
consolidating. A real estate plan can be prepared for each
business unit taking into account its specific business plan
and operating plan to capture value-added opportunities.
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EASTMAN KODAK CASE
In 1993 Eastman Kodak Company was a large, multinational
corporation with four main business segments: Imaging,
Chemicals, Health, and Information. Headquartered in
Rochester, New York, Kodak's 1992 revenues were $20.2 billion
and net earnings were $1.1 billion ($3.53/share). Kodak had
132,600 employees worldwide including 77,100 in the United
States (Eastman Kodak 1992 Annual Report). Because of its
global reputation for quality, reliability and trust, the
Kodak name brand was estimated to be worth almost $9 billion
in 1992 by a leading business publication.
CORPORATE STRATEGY
In 1992, according to Mr. Kay R. Whitmore, Kodak's Chief
Executive Officer, the driving business force at Eastman Kodak
was increasing shareholder value. The corporate strategy was
to develop new technologies and enter new markets while
improving financial results. Implementation of this strategy
included using the concept known as "right sizing," aligning
the company's structural costs with sustainable growth
projections. Consequently, Kodak was in the process of
divesting certain assets considered by management to be
outside the company's strategic core. The Eastman Kodak
Corporate Real Estate Organization, CREO, was actively
involved with the disposition of the company's real estate
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assets.
ALLIANCE PARTNERSHIP
Starting in 1992 CREO began applying what it called the
Alliance Partnership process to its real estate activities.
This model had initially been developed in 1987 for improving
over-the-road delivery of Kodak manufactured high performance
copiers to customers throughout North America. John Englert,
a logistics manager at Kodak, was the person responsible for
developing and managing Kodak's transportation strategic
alliance with Bekins, the long distance moving company.
Englert transferred into CREO in 1992 to help implement
strategic alliances in the real estate function (Englert).
Recently Englert explained the Alliance Partnership
process as straightforward and readily transferrable to a wide
variety of business situations.
"For us, strategic alliances are operationally
simple but organizationally painful."
In his view the biggest obstacle to overcome was
organizational inertia that resisted change. Some of the
issues to be addressed included: people's concerns that
proprietary information would be revealed to outsiders to the
detriment of Kodak; the loss of employment that would result
for Kodak employees whose work would be transferred to
Alliance Partners; and the negative opinion of those who had
had disappointing experiences with previous efforts involving
"trading partners" where the promised benefits had failed to
materialize. Englert expressed confidence the Alliance
Partnership process he designed would meet these challenges
and bring improved financial results to CREO. In his view the
foundation of the Alliance Partnership process was the
commitment of both partners to the long term success of the
relationship.
BEST OF CLASS
Englert described the mission of CREO was to conduct its
business so well it would be recognized as the "Best of Class"
by other corporate real estate units and by independent real
estate developers. The criteria for achieving "Best of Class"
status involved creating value. Essentially, value creation
meant using effective work practices or processes that reduced
cost, increased asset utilization, or created a measurable
differential through an increased level of service. By
achieving these objectives, value was created for Eastman
Kodak. At Kodak in 1992 the primary financial performance
evaluation was ROA, return on assets. To determine how CREO
added value to Kodak, measurements were regularly made on
three dimensions: utilization of assets; achievement of cost
reductions; and divestment of assets.
To be "Best of Class" the results had to be greater than
what could have been achieved by using the best available
alternative offered by competitors in the marketplace. The
combination of financially based measurements and market-place
comparison led Kodak to the use of strategic alliances to meet
its objectives.
CORE COMPETENCIES
CREO defined its core competencies as the skills and
knowledge it wanted to maintain internally. These core
competencies were directly related to improving financial
results. The CREO core competencies included:
- Asset Management & Strategic Business/Real Estate
Planning;
- Value Added Property Development;
- Value Added Support Services;
- Financial Approach to Renovation and
Construction;
- Market Driven Property Management;
- Innovative Working Environments;
- Project Delivery Process;
- Non-Traditional Funding Sources;
- Internal Space Brokerage.
CREO was a small and flexible operating group that knew
the Kodak culture and understood the business units'
objectives relative to overall corporate strategy. The
managers at CREO thought of themselves as "process drivers"
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who helped the business unit managers reach a decision point
in real estate matters. When a decision was reached, CREO
acted as the bridge between the business unit and the resource
that implemented the real estate transaction.
ESTABLISHING PARTNERSHIPS
Establishing an Alliance Partnership first involved
identification of a function which was not considered a core
competency but for which the company had a regular need.
Englert defined these as Core Functions. For example, CREO
had an Alliance Partnership for real estate brokerage service.
Next, the CREO management determined who were the recognized
experts in that function and it decided how a strategic
alliance with a recognized leader would add value to Kodak.
Contract documents were drafted including a carefully prepared
scope of work and a detailed specification with performance
measurements. The scope of work included a finite timetable.
CREO then invited the predetermined list of qualified
suppliers to a common meeting to have the business opportunity
explained. At the meeting the CREO manager carefully outlined
to the participants the opportunity was for a defined scope of
work that would immediately transform into an ongoing
relationship. The message was communicated that Kodak wanted
to select a partner for a strategic relationship that would
grow and be everlasting. The invitees were then asked if they
wanted to prepare a proposal in response to CREO's Request for
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Proposal. Interestingly, not all invitees selected to submit
proposals. In one case 19 companies were invited to propose
but only 10 decided to do so. Once the proposals were
received, they were evaluated by a small team of Kodak
managers. They determined the "short list" of candidates
(from 3 to 5) from which the partner would be selected. This
group of short listed proposers was then notified of their
initial success and requested to make a one hour presentation
to the Kodak team. The purpose of the presentation was for
each service supplier to explain how its proposal would create
value for both parties of the Alliance Partnership. All
presentations were made on the same day. The Kodak team used
a quantitative system for ranking each presentation and a
partner was selected by consensus that day.
Typically a new Alliance Partnership was launched in a
small scale program mode to allow both partners the
opportunity to observe and adjust for maximum effectiveness.
When the level of performance was deemed ready, the Alliance
Partnership was made available for broader application
throughout the Kodak Company.
From 1992 to 1993 CREO entered five Alliance
Partnerships. The services included real estate brokerage,
electric energy services, construction management, janitorial
services, and mailroom/copy center services. Three more were
being investigated: a second energy services alliance; a
telecommunication partnership; and one for loading dock
operations. Also, Englert noted that CREO had used the
process to identify a mechanical trade partner but ultimately
the decision was made to award the work to the existing
internal staff. Nevertheless, the process achieved measurable
results for Kodak. In the face of competition from external
sources, the internal mechanical staff re-engineered its work
practices, reduced its size from 30 to 18 employees, and
agreed to ease the collective bargaining restrictions on using
contract labor during periods of peak demand.
MOTIVATIONS AND BENEFITS
The motivations to CREO for using Alliance Partnerships
were several:
- Improved Performance;
- Reduced Cost Structure;
- Increased Organizational Flexibility;
- Reduced Investment in Assets;
- Improved Customer Satisfaction.
Englert used the case of the Alliance Partnership with
ISS International Service System, Inc., for janitorial
services to illustrate the point. ISS was a Danish company
that performed cleaning and other building services throughout
the world. It had annual revenues of nearly $3 billion.
Because it was their area of specialization, ISS used more
efficient cleaning techniques and made far greater investments
in training than had been the case when Kodak employees did
the cleaning. Before the ISS Alliance Partnership was
established, Kodak had 60 janitors, 2 supervisors and 1
manager assigned to the work. After the Alliance Partnership
was formed Kodak had one employee assigned to manage the
relationship with ISS. And, because the ISS crew was more
efficient, Kodak realized an additional bonus of $100,000 in
annual savings by being able to turn off the lights earlier
each evening.
Mr. Jan Kaupas, president of ISS North America, recently
observed a primary benefit to Kodak was the reduction in the
cost of the service. Also, he claimed, there was a 25%
improvement in the quality of service performed by ISS versus
the quality that had been performed by the in-house staff.
According to Kaupas, these benefits meant there was an
increase in customer satisfaction, the customers being the
people whose facilities were being cleaned (Kaupas).
Other values potentially being created for Kodak included
the business services ISS was considering purchasing from
Kodak. ISS was exploring having the Kodak Imaging Services
group provide office services (copying and records'
management) to their 150 office locations throughout the
United States. Second, ISS was interested in buying cleaning
supplies on a nationwide basis from an Eastman Chemical
Company subsidiary. Another benefit for Kodak was the
referral mechanism that had developed because of the trust and
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credibility the strategic alliance had created between ISS and
Kodak. Whenever Kaupas learned one of his other customers was
in need of a service that Kodak offered, he made Kodak aware
of the opportunity and helped introduce the Kodak people to
the new potential customer. According to Kaupas, this
referral mechanism worked both ways. Kaupas defined the
strategic alliance as a long term business relationship with
excellent potential for future business development for the
services ISS provided to the market-place.
FUTURE EXPECTATIONS
According to Englert the future at CREO will bring a
growing reliance on outside resources to accomplish the work
of the company. Englert described the organizational changes
that are likely to unfold. He said Charles Handy's 1989 work,
The Age of Unreason, provides the road map for Kodak in
particular and corporate America in general. The CREO plan
for meeting its future workload is based on the Shamrock
Organization model (Handy, 90). Like the shamrock, the CREO
organization will have three leaves. The first leaf
represents the core workers of qualified professionals,
technicians and managers essential to the organization. The
second leaf will be made up of people who perform the non-
essential work of the corporation. This is the work that can
be sensibly contracted out to people who specialize in the
function and so are able to do it better at lower cost. The
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third leaf of the organization will be the flexible work
force. This will include part-time workers and temporary
workers who expand and contract their services to match the
needs of their customers.
The benefits of using Alliance Partners are being
recognized at CREO more and more as the practice expands and
evolves. Englert predicted that the process will continue to
build on its success.
ALEXANDER & ALEXANDER CASE
Alexander & Alexander was a professional organization of
nearly 15,000 employees that provided risk management,
insurance brokerage and human resource management consulting
services to its clients around the world. To conduct its
global business, A&A maintained offices in more than 80
countries. The corporate operating results for 1992 included
revenues of $1.35 billion and income of $54.9 million from
continuing operations. Because of a $145 million loss from
discontinued operations, A&A reported a net loss for 1992 of
$90.1 million (Alexander & Alexander 1992 Annual Report). For
its business in the United States, Alexander & Alexander had
offices in more than 35 cities.
CORPORATE STRATEGY
The corporate strategic plan in 1992 was characterized by
a restructuring initiative that produced an operating expense
savings of $27 million. The restructuring objective was to
refocus the services of individual offices to be more aligned
with the needs of each local client base. The savings were
realized by consolidating several local operations and closing
marginal offices. A&A's Chairman and Chief Executive Officer,
Tinsley H.Irvin, claimed the refocusing improved client
retention and aided new business development. Consequently,
not only were operating expenses reduced but revenues
increased. Irvin stated the business environment at Alexander
& Alexander in the 1990s would be shaped by consulting-
oriented relationships with its clients.
REAL ESTATE STRATEGY
The corporate real estate activities were managed by Mr.
Ray Celli, Vice President of Facilities Management. In
addition to real estate matters, he was responsible for all
purchasing, fleet operations and corporate travel activities
(Celli). For his areas of responsibility, Celli had several
strategic alliances with outside service providers. His
primary principle for deciding when to use a strategic
alliance was his ability to define a discrete activity that a
specialist could perform more efficiently. His operating
style was to establish broad and general service agreements
that were perpetual. As a general rule, A&A's strategic
alliance partners were also corporate customers. Celli noted
this situation of mutual benefit tended to strengthen the
relationship between A&A and its service provider partners.
Alexander & Alexander's corporate real estate staff for
the United States operations was small; one vice president and
three real estate managers with one of the three manager
positions unfilled in 1993. The people on this staff
concentrated on performing the strategic planning activities
associated with managing the real estate portfolio. Celli
explained that the strategic nature of the work done by the
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real estate group often involved investigating and researching
several options. Frequently, considerable effort was expended
before a judgment could be made on the value any particular
alternative had relative to A&A's overall business objectives.
For those alternatives judged to be of little or no value to
the firm, work was performed from which no measurable benefit
would accrue. The indeterminate nature of this kind of
strategic analysis meant it could not be defined well enough
for Celli to organize a strategic alliance to have it done.
When the analysis concluded a routine real estate
transaction was the best course of action, Alexander &
Alexander depended on outside resources to execute the deal.
For much of the United States geography, tenant representation
and lease negotiations were performed by LaSalle Partners.
Other real estate services, such as design and construction
activities for tenant improvements, were performed by other
strategic alliance partners. Celli clarified that legal,
financial and accounting work for real estate transactions
were handled by other Alexander & Alexander departments.
BENEFITS
The strategic alliances Celli organized provided several
benefits to Alexander & Alexander. For example, according to
Celli, the strategic alliance with LaSalle Partners allowed
him to leverage the utilization of his internal resources.
Because of its relationship with the LaSalle organization, it
was natural for the A&A real estate group to tap into
LaSalle's knowledge of market data and industry trends. This
knowledge was folded into the strategic analysis work
performed by the real estate unit. Celli noted the benefit of
efficiency that derived from having the operational procedures
codified. By using LaSalle Partners for most of the real
estate transactions throughout the United States, Alexander &
Alexander managers did not have to become acquainted with the
idiosyncracies of different service providers.
Celli identified two important benefits that the service
provider gained from a strategic alliance partnership with
Alexander & Alexander. Once again he cited the real estate
strategic alliance was a typical example. Because of the long
term nature of the deal, LaSalle could accurately predict the
annual volume of business the strategic alliance with
Alexander & Alexander would generate. LaSalle managers
confidently used this information to plan its own operations
and to look for economies to lower its cost structure.
Second, because it did not have to compete for the Alexander
& Alexander work, the LaSalle organization did not have to
allocate precious marketing resources to the that account.
FUTURE EXPECTATIONS
The ultimate real estate strategic alliance in Celli's
opinion would be one that would cross international
boundaries. He quickly noted such a situation would not be
available in the foreseeable future. But the evidence was
plentiful that the fragmented nature of the real estate
industry caused inefficiencies and lost time.
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CHAPTER 5
ANALYSIS
CONTEXT
A major assumption of this research was that increased
global competition has caused fundamental changes to corporate
business practices. Increasing shareholder value has become
a maxim. Managers are expected to evaluate the full range of
company activities, primary as well as support activities, to
identify every source of competitive advantage. One of the
most noteworthy changes this has brought about has been the
increased application of strategic alliances aimed at helping
companies gain a competitive edge in the market-place.
I reviewed the structural analysis theory and the
behavioral theory concerning strategy formulation. According
to Porter, analysis of the company, its industry and the
operating environment gave managers the data needed to create
a successful strategy for earning an above average rate of
return. Prahalad, Hamel and others theorized the key to
success was developing core competencies; the work processes
and human resource skills that allowed a company to capitalize
on new opportunities in ways that competitors are unable to
do. The core competencies of a business unit such as Kodak's
CREO are at a different level from the corporate core
competencies. The managers at CREO focused their
organizational strengths on the internal activities that
allowed them to maximize their contribution to corporate value
through their knowledge of the corporate objectives and
company culture. The managers at CREO considered themselves
to be "process drivers" acting as the bridge from internal
needs to external partners.
A review of industry literature indicated there was a
growing management awareness about the significance of a
corporation's real estate assets relative to the financial
performance of the company. Consequently, corporate real
estate managers have become more strategically oriented in
their job performance.
This was the context in which corporate real estate units
operated in 1993. My expectation was research would show that
corporate real estate unit managers could demonstrate how
their operating strategies added value to the corporation.
Strategic alliances with outside service providers were
expected to be a significant element of the operating
strategies. The cases I studied provided different examples
of how corporations have used strategic alliances to meet the
increased level of business competition. And, two of the
cases have illustrated how the strategic alliances have
evolved beyond initial expectations to provide more benefits
to the partners.
COMPARISON OF CASES
The cases I studied included three large American-based
multinational corporations. NAGF and Kodak were manufacturers
while Alexander & Alexander was a professional services firm.
All companies were significant global enterprises. NAGF and
Kodak both were several times larger than Alexander &
Alexander in revenues and number of employees. All
corporations earned more than a billion dollars in revenues in
1992. NAGF was a North American operation. Kodak and
Alexander & Alexander both took in two-thirds of their annual
revenues from their North American operations with European
operations being the next major source of revenue. All three
companies had thousands of employees working in dozens of
locations.
At NAGF, the real estate unit was also led by the
assistant treasurer who directed a staff of two managers. At
Kodak the corporate real estate unit was managed by a vice
president who directed a group of 4 functional managers
(property manager, asset manager, financial manager, and
director of field real estate) who were supported by several
professionals and administrative staff members. At Alexander
& Alexander, the real estate unit was also lead by a vice
president who directed a staff of two managers. The real
estate units at Kodak and NAGF were independent operating
units that focused on financial performance measurements
The real estate unit at Alexander & Alexander was integrated
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in an organization that including corporate purchasing and
other related support services.
ALIGNMENT WITH CORPORATE STRATEGY
One of the most interesting issues considered was how the
corporate real estate unit strategy related to the corporate
strategy.
The mission for the parent organization at NAGF was to be
the most successful consumer packaged goods company in the
world. The strategies for doing that included maximizing
productivity, improving total quality and focusing on
financial performance. The corporate real estate unit was
recently re-engineered to rely on strategic alliances for all
market transactions. The partnership structure allowed NAGF
to share the commissions on deals in return for the steady
level of business. This gave the real estate unit a source of
income that was reported on the corporate bottom line. Every
transaction was measured for quality performance. Organizing
the strategic alliances caused the real estate unit to write
an operating guidebook. Having it ensured a consistent
approach was used on all transactions. Performance was
measured against defined criteria so quality was quantified.
This type of system allowed trends to be monitored so
performance could be continuously adjusted and improved. And,
the implementation of the electronic project status report
advanced organizational productivity by making all data
available to all organizational members in real-time.
The corporate strategy at Kodak was to develop new
technologies and enter new markets while improving financial
performance. The mission at Kodak's CREO was to achieve "Best
of Class" status by creating value. The strategic alliance
with ISS created value several ways. The cross referral
mechanism was opening up new markets for Kodak to capture.
Also, due to the alignment of interests between Kodak and ISS
resulting from the office cleaning strategic alliance, ISS was
investigating using Kodak manufactured cleaning chemicals
throughout its multi-billion dollar cleaning business. And
due to the greater productivity of the ISS crew, Kodak was
realizing an unexpected annual bonus of $100,000 on lower
energy costs. Financial performance was judged on the basis of
return on assets and the results were compared to market-
place. CREO's financial emphasis on operational activities
was consistent with corporate strategy.
At Alexander & Alexander the corporate strategy was
centered on a restructuring initiative. Its objective was to
refocus the company on customer needs. The real estate unit
concentrated on analytical work required to ensure the real
estate needs of its customers, the Alexander & Alexander
operating units, were satisfied. All real estate market
transactions were performed by outside experts. By using
LaSalle Partners for the routine transactions, the procedures
were codified across the country. This repetition provided
for higher quality of service. Because the performance was
consistent from transaction to transaction, there was a
greater efficiency involved for the Alexander & Alexander
offices that were being serviced. Therefore, the A&A managers
in the field were freed to spend more of their time with their
customers rather than being forced to coordinate LaSalle's
efforts. Again the mission and operation of the real estate
unit were aligned with corporate strategy.
DETERMINATION OF STRATEGIC ALLIANCES
The NAGF process for determining the scope of work to be
performed by the strategic alliance service provider partner
has been identified as a model of excellence for the industry.
Other corporations are using it as a guide. It was clear to
all participants what the objectives were, what the
requirements were and what the benefits would be. The process
followed by NAGF was consistent with recommendations in the
article by Bowersox on strategic alliances (Bowersox, 36-45).
In the article he recommended sharing information,
establishing clear roles, measuring performance, and ensuring
all participants involved consider their roles in terms of
value-added processes.
At Kodak, functional activities that were to be performed
by the corporate staff were identified as the group's core
competencies. In the same way the business unit strategy is
more narrow in scope than corporate strategy, it is consistent
and makes sense for the core competencies of the business unit
like CREO to focus on functional responsibilities. The
managers at CREO have identified those functions they consider
essential to the organizational success. These process-
related capabilities have been maintained internally. All
other functional activities that CREO was responsible for
providing to corporate business units were considered suitable
for strategic alliances. Decisions about the scope of an
alliance and the partners to work with are made using
financially-based considerations.
The Alexander & Alexander process was somewhat different.
Analytical work and non-routine activities were performed by
the corporate real estate staff. All ordinary real estate
market transactions were performed by strategic alliance
partners. Although the corporate real estate unit was using
strategic alliance partners for routine transactions, not all
Alexander & Alexander departments were. For example, the legal
work associated with real estate transactions was performed by
staff lawyers.
SELECTION PROCESS
In the NAGF case, the evaluation methodology was careful
and deliberate. The strategic nature of the alliance was
commonly understood by both partners before the deal was
finalized. NAGF's objectives in organizing real estate
strategic alliances were to capture some of the value that
would be created by consolidating the transactions associated
with its portfolio with two service providers while improving
quality. The selection process it followed did that.
The Kodak selection process for strategic alliance
partners followed the theoretical expectation. When a scope
of work for a strategic alliance was determined, a methodology
was followed for identification and selection of a partner who
had a demonstrated plan for adding value to the Kodak real
estate operation. The objectives at CREO were to achieve
"Best of Class" status by using effective work practices or
processes that reduced cost, increased asset utilization or
increased the level of service. The selection of ISS as a
strategic partner met the objectives.
At Alexander & Alexander, strategic alliances for real
estate services were based on broadly defined service
agreements with recognized industry leaders who were also
Alexander & Alexander customers. Alexander & Alexander
assigned to its strategic alliance partners all the discrete
and definable real estate market transactions its own internal
analysis deemed necessary. The basis for strategic alliance
partner selection used at Alexander & Alexander, aligning with
an existing corporate customer, may have been driven by the
real estate unit being integrated in the purchasing department
where there is frequent interaction between buyer and seller.
Or, the small size of the real estate unit may have been the
driver of the selection process.
RECOGNIZED BENEFITS
The NAGF case and the Kodak's CREO case were excellent
examples of how a corporate real estate units forged strategic
alliances with external service providers to create value for
the parent corporation. In both cases the strategic alliance
partners (the service providers) benefitted by knowing they
would have the corporations' work forever. Since they did not
have the threat of competition the service providers saved
money by not having to market their services to NAGF or Kodak.
Instead the emphasis was on developing a long range,
collaborative relationships and building trust. The common
goals were to improve work processes, shorten cycle time,
standardize methods and generally lower the cost structure so
profit margins would increase. The benefits were split
between the partners.
The major benefit the strategic alliances brought to
Alexander & Alexander's real estate operation was the ability
to leverage the work of a small staff while all transactions
were performed by industry leaders. Alexander & Alexander
received services at lower than market cost because its
relationships were perpetual. And, because its partners were
also its customers, the was an inherent level of trust and
cooperation.
CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
Increased economic pressure from global competition has
been the primary reason corporate real estate units have
recently displayed more willingness to enter strategic
alliances. To meet the challenge of greater global
competition, parent corporations have had to market their
products and services at lower prices with higher quality. In
turn, this has caused corporations to examine their entire
cost structure and at the same time evaluated in the context
of a total quality management framework. The objective has
been to insure all company efforts were focused on delivering
higher value products or service to the paying customers. The
activities evaluated included work performed by internal
employees as well as that being provided by external
suppliers. These activities were evidenced in the cases
examined and the interviews conducted.
For the managers of corporate real estate units, recent
corporate strategies have often dictated a reduction in staff
with an increased demand for higher performance, i.e., higher
quality and lower cost. In the face of constrained resources,
corporate real estate managers have rethought how they were
organized to deliver the land and building needs of their
companies. In 1993 and for the foreseeable future the
organizational response for corporate real estate units will
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be a marked increase in the use of strategic alliances with
expert service providers.
SLOW START
The real estate sector has been slower than other parts
of American industry to embrace the concept of strategic
alliances to improve the quality and lower the costs of its
service. Three reasons why were noted by William Agnello.
First, the real estate industry has traditionally operated in
a cyclical pattern. This pattern created a willingness of
many in the industry to accept business downturns as
acceptable consequences. Second, even though it is a huge
industry, it is highly fragmented. And third, since the
business does not involve the import and export of products,
leaders in the real estate industry have not considered
themselves as participants in the global economy. This myopic
view, according to Agnello, prevented most from recognizing
the fundamental shift that occurred in the business
environment.
Another reason that contributed to the slow start is the
traditionally bureaucratic nature of corporate organizations
where change is slow. Also, corporations are cautious
institutions and several agreements are required before a
major policy change can be implemented. And, control is a
major consideration in corporate real estate units so sharing
control with a partner will not be given freely
CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESS
Based on the cases examined and the interviews conducted,
a conclusion of this study is the rate of success of strategic
alliances for real estate services will be enhanced if the
following conditions are present.
An agreement is needed which defines how the partners
will work together. The agreement will describe the
objectives of the alliance, the resources to be applied by
each partner, the framework for communicating information and
data, the performance criteria, and a system for measuring
quality.
The strategic alliance must be organized for specific
goals while being responsive to the market-place. The Kodak
example identified how partnerships provide new opportunities
for leveraging the business of the two organizations as the
partners begin to understand and appreciate each others
capabilities.
The partners must agree to make mutual investments with
mutual sharing of risk and reward. For example, the NAGF real
estate unit had to prepare an operating manual for the first
time in its 50 year history to properly specify the duties of
its strategic partners. In return, the strategic partners had
to agree to share large commissions in order to secure a
steady level of business.
The characteristics of the corporate real estate units
most likely to enter strategic alliances include those who
commit to total quality performance in every aspect of its
business. Units charged with broad missions such as improving
the work environment, lowering occupancy costs, or reducing
the corporate asset base are interested in exploring the
innovative business arrangements strategic alliances allow.
There must be a corporate culture receptive to long-term
relationships with leading service suppliers. This is more
often the case when corporate real estate units are managed by
business generalists versus real estate specialists. For
example the several strategic alliances noted in the Kodak
case were established under the direction of a real estate
director who had transferred into the real estate function
after many years of service in other corporate areas.
FUTURE
The trend for corporate real estate units will most
likely include a greater emphasis on strategic activities such
as long-range planning and risk analysis. The technical and
administrative work and the market transaction will be
assigned to strategic alliance partners. These partners will
be outside service providers who are recognized industry
leaders who can deliver quality products at the lowest price.
Maximizing the contribution of the real estate assets to
shareholder value will be the organizational goals.
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